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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the effect of political institutions on stock market performance in 14 African 
countries for which stock market data is available for the period 1990-2010.  The estimation 
technique used is a Two-Stage-Least Squares Instrumental Variable methodology. Political 
regime channels of democracy, polity and autocracy are instrumented with legal-origins, 
religious-legacies, income-levels and press-freedom qualities to account for stock market 
performance dynamics of capitalization, value traded, turnover and number of listed companies. 
The findings show that countries with democratic regimes enjoy higher levels of financial market 
development compared to their counterparts with autocratic inclinations. As a policy implication, 
the role of sound political institutions has important effects on both the degree of competition for 
public office and the quality of public offices that favour stock market development on the 
African continent.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 The evolution of politics in Africa, vis-à-vis the investment climate and financial market 
development can be discussed in two main stages, notably: (i) before the fall of the Berlin wall 
that marked the advent of multiparty politics and (ii) the post-1989 era that is characterized  by 
multiparty politics and the growth of stock markets. According to Yartey and Adjasi (2007), 
there has been substantial progress in stock markets in Africa since the 1990s. Before 1989, there 
were only eight stock markets in the continent: three in North Africa and five in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Today there are 29 stock markets representing thirty-eight countries. With the exception 
of South Africa, between 1992 and 2002, stock market capitalization doubled in most countries: 
increasing to US$244.672 million from US$113.423 million . Unfortunately, these developments 
have not moved hand-in-glove with maturity in stock markets. This is essentially because in 
many of the stock markets, trading still occurs in a very limited number of stocks which make-up 
a substantial part of the total market capitalization. Moreover, vital issues in disclosure, 
information-sharing and supervision that are related to the overall institutional quality are 
affecting the development of these stock markets. Such institutional concerns are closely related 
to the quality of government.  
The emergence of London as a major financial center in the world can be explained by 
her tradition of fairness in the settlement of judicial matters (Asongu, 2012a). According to the 
narrative, the experience of Russia has shown that foreign investors are more likely to invest in 
environments that are characterized by limited expropriation risk and sound political institutions.  
 The growing depth and width of financial markets in developing countries (IMF, 2008; 
Mosley, 2008) has unfortunately been accompanied by  deteriorating levels of political 
governance in recent decades (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). While the bulk of political 
science literature has focused on mechanisms by which globalization in finance and trade 
influence government policy choices and economic outcomes (Friedman, 1999; Obstfeld & 
Taylor, 2004), as far as we have reviewed, little is currently known about how political regimes 
affect the health of financial markets. We fill this gap by assessing the effect of political regimes 
on stock market performance in Africa.  
 Consistent with Asongu (2012a), the intuition behind the inquiry is that the process 
enhancing the value of stock markets is contingent on policies which are the result of 
institutional processes. Hence, it is relevant to examine how political regimes influence stock 
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market performance on the continent for at least a two reasons. First, the African business 
literature has substantially documented the  need for other forms of investment because 
privatization and liberalization projects have failed to deliver the much needed foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Asongu, 2013). Second, there is a growing stream 
of African stock market literature showing that the stock markets of the continent substantially 
depend on the quality of institutions (Asongu, 2012a).  
With the above facts in mind, the political climate in Africa over the past decades has 
been characterized by political strife, violence and a plethora of governance issues, notably: the 
Kenyan 2007/2008 post-election violence; Nigeria’s 2008 marred transition; the 2011 Arab 
Spring and negative externalities across North Africa; Côte d’Ivoire’s unfortunate political 
transition in 2011; the South-Sudanese political crisis that began in mid-December 2013 and has 
displaced hundreds of thousands of citizens and the Burundian failing  political transition  since 
April 2015 which has been caused by President’s Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek a third 
term in office.  
In the light of the above, the present inquiry assesses how political regimes of democracy 
and autocracy affect stock market performance in the African countries for which a stock market 
exists. The study’s contribution to  current literature is at least fivefold. First, due to lack of 
relevant data, the relationship between stock market performance and political regimes has 
received little scholarly attention. Accordingly, stock markets on the continent for the most part 
are in their infancy. Second, the growing depth of financial markets on the continent represents 
an interesting opportunity to assess the role of political regimes in their evolution. Third, we 
have highlighted above that the continent is in dire need of alternative forms of investment. 
Moreover, recent African business literature is consistent with the position that institutional 
arrangements have contributed substantially to affecting the state of capital flows across the 
continent (Bartel et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012). Therefore, it is relevant to assess the 
influence of political regimes on stock market development or long-run finance. Fourth, current 
trends in stock market on the continent reveal that, countries in the French-speaking community 
have comparatively less healthy stock markets. Given that Africa’s former French colonies have 
registered more coup d’états than the rest combined since independence (Klah, 2010), findings 
from the study could provide some insights into why these set of countries are lagging behind 
their English counterparts. Fifth, despite the wealth of studies in the literature on finance and 
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institutions, there has been limited focus on Africa. Alagidede (2008) has argued that the 
underlying neglect is partly traceable to the institutional environment of Africa. The theoretical 
underpinning motivating this line of inquiry is the law and finance theory from Beck et al. 
(2003).    
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are discussed in Section 3. Section 
4 concludes.  
 
2. Intuition and theoretical background 
 
 The intuition for assessing the relationship between political regimes and stock market 
development builds on the fact that political institutions are very likely to influence arrangements 
that regulate stock markets.  Within this framework, legal and supervisory bodies that provide 
order and cohesion in financial markets are shaped by political institutions. The intuition here is 
broadly consistent with the literature supporting the relationship between political connections 
and market value (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2002; Francis et al., 2009). Hence, it is logical to think 
that democratic versus autocratic institutions have important and considerable implications on 
these relationships and dealings between firms and their sources of capital.  
 According to the World Bank (2010): (i) ‘institutionalized democracy’ is the presence of 
procedures and institutions via which citizens can express their preferences about alternative 
leaders and policies, that guarantee civil liberties for all citizens and (ii) ‘institutionalized 
autocracy’ is the absence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express their 
preferences about them. In the latter case, there is an absence of guarantee for civil liberties for 
all citizens.  
 In the light of the above, political regimes and financial development are directly linked 
to political actions which affect financial development. For instance, Keefer (2007) has shown 
that government actions influence financial development through channels of inter alia: secured 
property, financial regulation and contracts rights. Hence, such public commodities are sensitive 
to political incentives. Political economy theories are consistent with the view that where a small 
elite control political decisions, financial development can be constrained by the lack of 
competition. This theoretical underpinning has been confirmed by Girma and Shortland (2008). 
Given that autocratic regimes are more characterized by a narrow elite that influences political 
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decisions, we expect democratic regimes to more positively influence stock market development. 
A democratic environment is more likely to increase shareholders’ return by reducing both 
agency and transaction costs. Moreover, within the framework of financial markets, compared to 
autocratic institutions, democratic institutions are more likely to enforce the control of corruption 
which is a source of insider-trading in financial markets. It is interesting to note that insider- 
trading has been documented to reduce stock market development (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 
1999).  
 Under the assumption that autocratic regimes are less politically-stable, political regimes 
indirectly affect stock market activity through political uncertainty. In essence, political 
instability negatively affects stock market development because it limits economic growth. This 
perspective has been confirmed using broad (Alesina et al., 1996) and African-specific (Fosu, 
2002) samples. The indirect effect builds on the theory of investment uncertainty which has been 
confirmed by Bittlingmayer (1998) within Germany, notably that political uncertainty can 
simultaneously reduce output and increase volatility.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 14 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1990 to 2010 (World Bank, 2010). The 
sample is restricted to 14 countries due to data availability constraints. Consistent with recent 
African stock market literature (Asongu, 2012, 2013), the dependent variables are: stock market 
capitalization, stock market value traded, stock market turnover and number of listed companies.  
Political institutions variables include: democracy, polity and autocracy. Instrumental 
variables are: legal-origins, press-freedom, income-levels and religious-domination. These 
instruments are consistent with African stock market (Asongu, 2012a) and growth (Agbor, 2015) 
literature. Moreover, they have been substantially documented in the economic development 
literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Beck et al., 2003).  
In the regressions, we control for voice and accountability and regulation quality in the 
first-stage, but not in the second-stage. The control variables from which we expect positive 
effects are consistent with recent African law-finance literature (Asongu, 2012b). Selective 
introduction of control variables at the second-stage is in accordance with Beck et al (2003) and 
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Asongu (2012a). The choice of the control variables are also constrained by the degrees of 
freedom needed for the OIR test at the second-stage of regressions. In essence, given the number 
of instruments under consideration, control variables at the second-stage would either result in 
exact- or under-identification. Such implies that the instruments are either equal-to or less-than 
the number of endogenous explanatory variables respectively.  
 Definitions and sources of variables are presented in Appendix 1, while the summary 
statistics are disclosed in Appendix 2. A correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3 whereas 
categorization of countries is given in Appendix 4. Two insights are worth noting from the 
summary statistics: (i) the variables are comparable from mean values and (ii) the substantial 
variations imply we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages will emerge. The 
purpose of the correlation matrix is to limit potential multicollinearity issues. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Consistent with Beck et al. (2003) and recent African development (Asongu, 2014; 
Asongu and  Nwachukwu, 2016b) we adopt an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique. 
IV estimates address the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the inconsistency of estimated 
coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the explanatory variables are correlated with 
the error term in the main equation. The Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) technique entails the 
following steps. 
First-stage regression:  
 itit nlegalorigihannelPoliticalC )(10  itreligion)(2 itlincomeleve )(3                         
                               itompressfreed )(4   itiX                                                                  (1)                                                                   
Second-stage regression: 
 itit DemocracyFinance )(10  itAutocracy)(2 itiX                                         (2)                                                                                        
 
In both equations, X  is a set of explanatory control variables. For Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), v  
and u, respectively represent the disturbance terms. Instrumental variables include legal-origins, 
dominant-religion, press-freedom and income-levels. In Eq.(1), ‘ hannelPoliticalC ’ denotes: 
democracy, polity and autocracy. ‘ Finance’ in Eq.(2) represents stock market performance 
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dynamics in terms of  (i) stock market capitalization, (ii) stock market value traded, (iii) stock 
market turnover ratio and (iv) number of listed companies.  
 We adopt the following steps in the analysis: (i) justify the use of a 2SLS over an OLS 
estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity, (ii) demonstrate that the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explanatory variables (political 
institutions) conditional on other covariates (control variables) and (iii) verify that the 
instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of interest through an 
Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.  
To ensure further robustness, the following checks are performed: (1) usage of alternative 
indicators of political institutions, (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of 
instruments that engender every category of the instruments, (3) usage of alternative indicators 
of stock market performance and (4) employment of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
reduce the dimensions of stock market and political indicators.    
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
This section addresses: (i) the ability of the exogenous components of political 
institutions to account for differences in stock market performance, (ii) the ability of the 
instruments to explain variations in the endogenous components of political institutions and (iii) 
the possibility of the instruments to account for stock market performance beyond political 
institution channels. To these ends, we employ the 2SLS-IV estimations with legal-origin, press-
freedom, income-levels and religious-domination as instrumental variables. 
 
4.1. Political regimes and instruments  
 
 In Table 1 below, we regress the political-regime indicators on the instruments and test 
for their joint significance. This is the first-stage (requirement) of the IV estimation technique for 
which the endogenous components of the independent variables must be explained by the 
instruments, contingent on other covariates (control variables).  From the results of the Fisher-
statistics, it could be established that the instruments are strong, essentially because in presence 
of control variables they jointly enter significantly into all regressions at the one percent 
significance level. Thus, ‘instrumenting’ political regimes with legal-origin, religious-
domination, income-levels and press-freedom qualities help explain cross-country differences in 
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the quality of political institutions. We engage two separate regressions for each political-regime: 
one with the first set of instruments and the other with the second set. Results from both sets of 
instruments are similar. Based on the findings, the following could be established. (1) Consistent 
with the law-finance (growth) literature (La Portal et al., 1997, 1998; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 
2015), English common-law countries have higher levels of democracy compared to their French 
civil-law counterparts. (2) Contrary to Vaidya (2005) and Oscarsson (2008), democratic 
institutions improve with press-freedoms.   
 
Table 1: Political-regime channels and instruments (First-Stage regressions) 
  Democracy  Polity  Autocracy   
        
 Constant 0.948 6.374*** 21.016*** 0.359 -20.311*** 6.374*** 
  (0.456) (5.970) (8.080) (0.345) (-8.830) (5.970) 
 
Legal-
origins 
English  common-law 4.193*** --- -8.805*** --- 13.004*** --- 
 (4.417)  (-7.411)  (12.38)  
French civil-law --- -12.597*** --- 7.594*** --- -12.597*** 
  (-12.37)  (7.641)  (-12.37) 
 
Religions 
Christianity -1.062 --- -9.909*** --- 9.035*** --- 
 (-0.900)  (-6.706)  (6.914)  
Islam --- -8.171*** --- 7.211*** --- -8.171*** 
  (-7.089)  (6.408)  (-7.089) 
 
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Low Income --- -5.537*** --- 6.152*** --- -5.537*** 
  (-6.041)  (6.874)  (-6.041) 
Middle Income -0.479 --- -0.257 --- -0.236 --- 
 (-0.657)  (-0.282)  (-0.293)  
Lower Middle  Income -2.935*** --- -10.057*** --- 7.175*** --- 
 (-2.868)  (-7.848)  (6.332)  
Upper Middle Income --- -5.106*** --- 4.078*** --- -5.106*** 
  (-3.781)  (3.093)  (-3.781) 
 
 
Press 
Freedoms 
Free 4.113*** --- 5.375*** --- -1.193 --- 
 (5.032)  (5.253)  (-1.318)  
Partly Free 2.818*** --- 3.695*** --- -0.780 --- 
 (3.870)  (4.055)  (-0.969)  
No Freedom --- 0.108 --- -1.845** --- 0.1086 
  (0.131)  (-2.286)  (0.131) 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Regulation  Quality   1.601*** --- 2.384*** --- -0.804* --- 
 (3.721)  (4.425)  (-1.688)  
Voice and Accountability --- -1.914*** --- 5.716*** --- -1.914*** 
  (-2.867)  (8.767)  (-2.867) 
        
Adjusted R² 0.796 0.637 0.808 0.864 0.617 0.637 
Fisher test 61.842*** 32.957*** 66.576**** 116.951*** 26.107*** 32.957*** 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.  
 
 
4.2. Financial markets and democracy  
 This section seeks to address two main issues,(i) the ability of the exogenous components 
of political institutions to explain stock market performance and (ii) the ability of the instruments 
to explain stock market performance beyond political regime channels. To make these 
assessments, we employ the 2SLS-IV approach. 
 10 
In the second-stage regressions, we first justify our choice of the IV estimation technique 
with the Hausman test for endogeneity. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the position 
that the estimates from OLS are efficient and consistent. Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis 
reflects the presence of endogeneity and hence justifies the choice of our estimation technique. In 
cases where the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is not rejected (first four columns), 
regressions by OLS are provided. We also examine the validity and strength of the instruments 
with the Sargan-OIR and Craig-Donald tests respectively. The null hypothesis of the OIR test is 
the position that the instruments explain stock market performance only through political regime 
channels. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis is a dismissal of the view that the 
instruments do not explain stock market performance beyond political regime channels. The 
Craig-Donald test is for the strength of the instruments at first-stage regressions. Its null 
hypothesis is the position that the instruments are weak. Hence its rejection confirms the strength 
of the instruments. While the first issue is addressed by the significance of estimated 
coefficients, the second issue depends on the outcome of the OIR test. 
With regard to the first concern, the overwhelming significance of political-regime 
effects on stock market performance dynamics indicates that democracy and polity positively 
affect stock market development, while autocracy (but for ‘listed companies’) reduces it. The 
signs and significance of these effects are robust to the ‘stock market index’ regressions in the 
last column of Table 2. With regards to the second issue which is addressed by the Sargan-OIR 
test, only the instruments pertaining to ‘stock market turnover’ and ‘stock market index’ 
regressions are valid, since their null hypotheses are not rejected. Hence we conclude that in 
addition to political regime channels, the instruments explain the ‘number of listed companies’ 
through some other channels. Moreover, the instruments do not explain ‘stock market turnover’ 
and ‘stock market index’ beyond political regime channels. For all regressions that passed the 
Hausman test (last five columns), the instruments are strong based on the Craig-Donald test since 
the critical values for 2SLS bias relative to OLS are 15.72 and 9.48 at five percent and ten 
percent significance levels respectively. Overall, our findings are inconsistent with Mulligan et 
al. (2004) because democracies have important effects on both the degree of competition for 
public office and the quality of public policies that favour stock market expansion in developing 
countries.  
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Table 2: Second-Stage regressions 
 Stock Market(SM) Performance Robustness 
 SM Capitalization SM Value Traded SM Turnover  Listed Companies  SM Index 
          
Constant 0.312*** 0.294*** 0.045* 0.041 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.022* 0.023* -0.277* 
 (6.594) (6.103) (1.825) (1.610) (3.192) (3.242) (1.876) (1.939) (-1.655) 
Democracy 0.0308*** --- 0.013*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** --- --- 
 (4.169)  (3.547)  (3.991)  (6.722)   
Polity 2(Revised) --- 0.034*** --- 0.014*** --- 0.008*** --- 0.012*** --- 
  (4.518)  (3.604)  (3.982)  (6.702)  
Democracy Index  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.580*** 
         (4.722) 
Autocracy  -0.019** 0.016 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.010*** -0.001 
 (-2.333) (1.302) (-0.866) (1.638) (-1.352) (0.987) (-0.842) (2.803) (-0.021) 
          
Hausman-test 4.190 4.240 2.496 2.524 7.473** 7.552** 6.545** 6.721** 5.593* 
OIR-Sargan --- --- --- --- 2.196 2.249 32.909*** 32.93*** 6.467 
P-value     [0.699] [0.690] [0.000] [0.000] [0.166] 
Craig-Donald --- --- --- --- 21.144** 20.992** 23.167** 22.982** 20.605** 
Adjusted R² 0.098 0.108 0.053 0.054 0.085 0.084 0.241 0.087 0.134 
Fisher Statistics  15.163*** 16.750*** 7.846*** 8.052*** 11.516*** 11.478*** 27.529*** 27.380*** 15.096*** 
Observations  259 259 245 245 158 158 163 163 154 
Initial Instruments  Constant; Lower-Middle-Income; Middle-Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press 
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper-Middle-Income; Low-Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press 
OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test for First-Stage regressions. Critical values for TSLS bias relative to OLS for 
Cragg-Donald Statistics are 15.72 and 9.48 for 5% and 10% respectively. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. The 
democracy index is the first principal component of democracy and polity, while the stock market index is the first principal component of all stock 
market performance dynamics.  
 
 
4. Concluding implications 
This paper has assessed the effect of political institutions on stock market performance in 
14 African countries for which stock market data is available for the period 1990-2010.  The 
estimation technique used is a Two-Stage-Least Squares Instrumental Variable methodology. 
Political regime channels of democracy, polity and autocracy are instrumented with legal-
origins, religious-legacies, income-levels and press-freedom qualities to account for stock market 
performance dynamics of capitalization, value traded, turnover and number of listed companies. 
The findings show that countries with democratic regimes enjoy higher levels of financial market 
development compared to their counterparts with autocratic inclinations. 
Consistent with the theoretical background, democracy and good governance increase 
stock market development directly and indirectly by favouring inter alia: reduced transaction 
and agency costs, improved corporate governance and investor protection, better enforceability 
of contracts, improved understanding of the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, and fairness in judicial administration of conflicts. It is important to balance this 
narrative with the possibility that autocracy can also positively affect stock market development 
in the area of increasing listed firms from the political connections and firm value literature. 
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Thus, this positive democracy-financial development nexus may partly elucidate the 
reasons why many African countries, especially those of Francophone Africa, have financial 
markets that are comparative less developed (see Asongu, 2012a). The relative importance of 
democratic institutions in English common-law countries compared to their French civil-law 
counterparts also provides insights into possibly why some French speaking countries (e.g the 
Douala Stock Exchange of Cameroon) have not improved much in operational activities since 
they were launched. It is also interesting to note that in the post-colonial era, as of 2014, 
countries in Francophone Africa had accounted for much more than half of the documented 
political coup d’états in Africa, notably: 45 versus 22 (Koutonin, 2014).  
 As a policy recommendation, the role of sound political institutions is crucial for 
financial development in Africa. Democracies have important effects on both the degree of 
competition for public office and the quality of public offices that favour stock market 
development on the continent.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions(Measurement) Sources 
Stock Market 
Capitalization  
SMC “Stock Market Capitalization (% of GDP): Measured as the share price 
times the number of shares outstanding”. 
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Stock Market 
Value Traded 
SMVT “Stock Market Total Value Traded (% of GDP): Measured as total value of 
shares traded during a given period”.  
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Stock Market 
Turnover  
SMT “Stock Market Turnover Ratio: Measured as total value of shares traded 
during a period divided by average market capitalization for that period”.  
World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Listed Companies  ListC Number of Listed Companies Per Capita (% of Population) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
 
Democracy   
 
Demo 
“Institutionalized Democracy: Measured by the presence of institutions 
and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders; the guarantee of civil liberties for all 
citizens”.  
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Polity Pol “Revised Combined  Polity Score: Measured as Net Democracy/ 
Autocracy Scores”.  
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Autocracy  
 
Auto 
“Institutionalized Autocracy: Measured by the absence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders; absence of guarantees for civil liberties for 
all citizens”. 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Regulation 
Quality  
R.Q “Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”.  
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Voice and 
Accountability  
V & A “Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and 
to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”.  
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Press Freedom  Free Freedom House Index : Level media freedom Freedom 
House 
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (1990 to 2010) 
  Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
       
 
Stock  
Market 
Performance 
Stock Market  Capitalization  0.354 0.521 0.008 3.382 259 
Stock Market  Value Traded   0.078 0.268 0.000 2.591 245 
Stock Market Turnover  0.095 0.119 0.000 0.704 253 
Number of Listed Companies  0.067 0.085 0.002 0.712 268 
       
Democracy Democracy Index 3.170 4.315 -8.000 10.000 294 
Polity Index(Revised) 0.653 6.499 -10.000 10.000 294 
 
Autocracy  Autocracy Index  2.544 3.837 -8.000 10.000 294 
       
Control 
Variables  
Regulation  Quality   -0.224 0.694 -2.394 0.905 168 
Voice and Accountability  -0.389 0.793 -1.805 1.047 168 
       
Legal 
Origin 
English Common-Law 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
French Civil-Law  0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
Religion  Christianity  0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
Islam  0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
       
 
Income 
Levels 
Low Income  0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
Middle Income 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
Lower Middle Income  0.428 0.495 0.000 1.000 294 
Upper Middle Income  0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294 
       
Freedom of 
the Press 
Press Freedom 0.345 0.476 0.000 1.000 165 
Partial Press Freedom 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 165 
No Press Freedom 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 165 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations  
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            Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis     
Stock  Market   Performance Political-regimes Control Vbles Instrumental  Variables  
SMC SMVT SMT ListC Demo Poli Auto R.Q V&A Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree  
1.000 0.863 0.733 0.242 0.294 0.331 -0.21 0.220 0.310 0.109 -0.10 0.123 -0.12 -0.14 0.144 -0.23 0.399 0.391 -0.12 -0.27 SMC 
 1.000 0.795 0.084 0.240 0.228 -0.10 0.218 0.257 0.074 -0.07 0.065 -0.06 -0.13 0.130 -0.13 0.274 0.337 -0.13 -0.21 SMV 
  1.000 0.078 0.118 0.056 0.039 0.128 0.096 -0.18 0.180 -0.24 0.242 -0.17 0.176 0.048 0.117 0.340 -0.06 -0.27 SMT 
   1.000 0.442 0.405 -0.16 0.334 0.458 0.146 -0.14 0.156 -0.15 -0.30 0.308 -0.26 0.596 0.557 -0.18 -0.37 ListC 
    1.000 0.805 -0.25 0.526 0.840 0.535 -0.53 0.353 -0.35 0.031 -0.03 -0.63 0.667 0.679 0.051 -0.69 Demo 
     1.000 -0.77 0.429 0.836 0.496 -0.49 0.437 -0.43 0.032 -0.03 -0.68 0.718 0.667 0.060 -069 Poli 
      1.000 -0.08 -0.39 -0.23 0.232 -0.33 0.336 -0.03 0.032 0.434 -0.44 -0.30 -0.03 0.324 Auto 
       1.000 0.725 0.013 -0.01 0.066 -0.06 -0.39 0.399 -0.20 0.627 0.618 -0.02 -0.58 R.Q 
        1.000 0.471 -0.47 0.397 -0.39 -0.07 0.079 -0.67 0.821 0.805 -0.00 -0.78 V&A 
         1.000 -1.00 0.650 -0.65 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 0.173 -0.36 Eng. 
          1.000 -0.65 0.650 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 -0.17 0.368 Frch. 
           1.000 -1.00 0.400 -0.40 -0.73 0.400 0.229 -0.37 0.100 Chris 
            1.000 -4.00 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 0.377 -0.10 Islam 
             1.000 -1.00 -0.54 -0.40 -0.36 0.095 0.268 LI 
              1.000 0.547 0.400 0.363 -0.09 -0.26 MI 
               1.000 -0.54 -0.44 0.020 0.410 LMI 
                1.000 0.775 -0.11 -0.64 UMI 
                 1.000 -0.39 -0.62 Free 
                  1.000 -0.46 PFree 
                   1.000 NFree 
                     
SMC: Stock Market Capitalization. SMVT: Stock Market Value Traded. SMT: Stock Market Turnover. ListC: Listed Companies. Demo: Democracy. Poli: Polity. Auto: Autocracy. R.Q: Regulation 
Quality. V&A: Voice and Accountability. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch. French Civil-Law. Chris: Christianity. LI: Low Income Countries. MI: Middle-Income-Countries. LMI: Lower-Middle-
Income Countries. UMI: Upper-Middle-Income Countries. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press.  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries (as of 2010) 
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num 
 
Law 
English Common-Law Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
10 
   
French Civil-Law Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 4 
    
 
Religion  
Christianity  Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
10 
   
Islam  Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia. 4 
    
 
Income 
Levels 
Low-Income  Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 4 
   
Middle-Income Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia.  
10 
   
Lower-Middle-Income  Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia.  
8 
   
Upper-Middle-Income   Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa. 4 
Num: Number of cross sections(countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Agbor, J. A., (2015). “How does colonial origin matter for economic performance in SubSaharan 
Africa?”, in Growth and Institutions in African Development, First edited by Augustin K. Fosu, 
2015, Chapter 13, pp. 309-327, Routledge Studies in Development Economics: New York. 
 
Alagidede, P.,(2008). “African Stock Market Integration: Implications for Portfolio 
Diversification and International Risk Sharing”, Proceedings of the African Economic 
Conferences 2008.  
 
Alesina, A., Ozler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996). “Political instability and economic 
growth”. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), pp. 189-211. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2012a). “Government quality determinants of stock market performance in 
African countries”, Journal of African Business, 13(3), pp. 183-199.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2012b). “Law and finance in Africa”, Brussels Economic Review, 55(4), pp. 385-
408. 
Asongu, S. A., (2013). “African Stock Market Performance dynamics: A Multidimensional 
Convergence Assessment”, Journal of African Business, 14(3), pp. 186-201.  
 17 
Asongu, S. A. (2014). “The questionable economics of development assistance in Africa: 
hotfresh evidence, hot-fresh evidence”, The Review of Black Political Economy, 41, (4), pp. 455- 
480. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J., (2016a). “Revolution Empirics: Predicting the Arab”, 
Empirical Economics: Forthcoming.  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00181-015-1013-0  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J., (2016b). “Foreign aid and governance in Africa”, 
International Review of Applied Economics, 30(1), pp. 69-88. 
Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S.N., & Lederer, S., (2009).“Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues”, Journal of African Business, 10(2), 141-162. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R.,(2003). “Law and finance: why does legal origin 
matter?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), pp. 653-675.  
Bhattacharya, U., & Daouk, H., (1999). “The world price of insider-trading”, Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), pp. 75-108. 
 
Bittlingmayer, G., (1998), “Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural 
Experiment: Germany, 1880-1940”, Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2243-2257. 
Darley, W. K.,(2012), “Increasing Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Public Policy Challenges, Strategies, and Implications”, Journal of African Business, 13(1), 
pp.62-69.  
 
Faccio, M. (2006). “Politically connected firms”. American Economic Review, 96(1), pp. 369-
386. 
 
Fisman, R. (2001). “Estimating the Value of Political Connections”. American Economic 
Review, 91(4), 1095-1102. 
 
Fosu, A. K., (2002). “ Political Instability and Economic Growth: Implications of Coup Events in 
Sub-Saharan Africa”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61(1), pp. 329-348.  
 
Francis, B. B., Iftekhar, H., & Xian, S. (2009). “Political connections and the process of going 
public: evidence from China”. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(4), pp. 696-719.  
 
Friedman, T., L., (1999). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Girma, S., & Shortland, A. (2008). “The political economy of financial development”. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 60(4), pp. 567-596. 
 
Gray, K. R., & Bythewoo, C., (2001). “Emerging Securities Exchanges in Africa. International 
Characteristics of the Nairobi Stock Exchange”, Journal of African Business,  2(3), pp.65-73. 
 
 18 
IMF (2006, April). “Market Development and Issues”, IMF Global Financial Stability Report, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/GFSR/2006/01/index.htm. 
 
Keefer, P. (2007). “Beyond legal origin and checks and balances: Political credibility, citizen 
information and financial sector development”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
4154, Washington.  
 
Klah, P., (2010). “Coups d’Etat en Afrique : Le rôle toxique de la France”, L’autre 
cinquantenaire, 1960-2010 : Afrique, les indépendances en questions :  
https://afriqueindependance.wordpress.com/2010/06/10/coups-detat-en-afrique-le-role-toxique-
de-la-france/ (Accessed : 09/10/2015).  
 
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A., (2011). “Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 12(2), 31-50. 
 
Koutonin, M. R., (2014). “14 African Countries Forced by France to Pay Colonial Tax For the 
Benefits of Slavery and Colonization”, Silicon Africa,  http://www.siliconafrica.com/france-
colonial-tax/ (Accessed: 12/03/2016).   
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., (1997). “Legal Determinants of 
External Finance”, Journal of Finance, 52(2), pp. 1131-1150. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., (1998). “Law and finance”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp.1113-1155. 
 
Mosley, L., (2008). “Taking Stock Seriously: Equity-Market Performance, Government Policy 
and Financial Globalization”. International Studies Quarterly, 52(2), pp.405-425.  
 
Obstfeld, M., & Taylor, A.M., (2004). Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Oscarsson, H., (2008), “Media and Quality of Government: A research overview”, Quality of 
Government Working Paper Series, 2008/12. 
 
Rolfe, R. J., & Woodward, D. P.,(2004). “Attracting foreign investment through privatization: 
the Zambian experience”, Journal of African Business, 5(1), pp.5-27.  
 
Stulz, R., M., & Williamson, R., (2003). “Culture, Openness and Finance”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70(3), pp. 313-349. 
Tuomi, K.,(2011). “The Role of the Investment Climate and Tax Incentives in the Foreign Direct 
Investment Decision: Evidence from South Africa”, Journal of African Business, 12(1), pp.133-
147. 
 
Vaidya, S., (2005), “Corruption in the media's gaze”, European Journal of Political Economy, 
21(3), pp.667-687. 
  
 19 
World Bank (2010). “World Development Indicators 2010”, The World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010 (Accessed: 
12/03/2016).  
 
Yartey, C. A., & Adjasi, C. K., (2007). “Stock Market Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Critical Issues and Challenges”,   International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/209, 
Washington.  
 
  
 
 
